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This paper describes the current science-based approach to ensuring public safety from
RF-EMF base stations. It acknowledges that a degree of public concern persists despite
the fact that dose limits are seldom if ever approached in practice. One plausible
contributor to the discord is a tendency within parts of academia and by some
planning authorities to pursue a technocratic policy approach to siting wherein public
concerns are attributed to scientific uncertainty over health risks, whereas the reality is that
societal concerns over base stations is broader. Thus, potential mis-framing of the debate
as a purely scientific issue leads to inappropriate risk communication exercises which in
fact polarise the situation by disenfranchising other potentially legitimate siting concerns. It
is recommended that more attention should be paid to the non-health related siting issues,
which could be handled by a thoughtful democratic / deliberative process, and that this
should not be conflated with the scientific debate over the uncertain and possibly non-
existent risks posed by RF EMF complying with the existing science-based dose limits.
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INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication uses electromagnetic waves in the Radio Frequency (RF) ranges of the
spectrum, which are of a much lower frequency compared to ionizing radiation. As such, RF waves
do not have enough energy to either break molecular bonds or even cause ionization of atoms in the
human body; hence, their classification as Non-Ionizing Radiation (NIR). The heating capabilities of
high-level RF-EMF exposure (e.g., from microwave ovens) are well known. The question is whether
there are some other enduring health effects at levels of exposure below the International
Commission on Non-Ionising Radiation Protection limit (ICNIRP, 2020). While some studies
have indicated the possibilities of non-thermal effects in living organisms, these have never been
substantiated. For example, a World Health Organization (WHO) Q&A on 5Gmobile networks and
health says that “provided that the overall exposure remains below international guidelines, no
consequences for public health are anticipated” (ITU/EMF 5G, 2021) and an investigation published
by Ofcom in February 2020 reports measurements of EMF exposures close to sixteen 5G-enabled
base stations plus other 2G, 3G and 4G locations in ten United Kingdom cities to be a small fraction
of the reference levels for public exposure in the ICNIRP Guidelines (ITU/EMF 5G, 2021 p.31).
There is no scientific reason to use different exposure limits in different countries, but there is
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Covid-19 pandemic and the related spread of misinformation
around 5G has exacerbated this trend and fueled by social
media, has caused incidents in many countries. Updated to
April 2021, 332 arson attacks have been reported in 21
countries in the past year1. In the context of 5G
infrastructure roll-out and ensuring the safety of existing
infrastructure and continuity of services, the incidents pose
a significant risk to the deployment and operation of existing
and next generation networks, despite the fact that
telecommunication networks have played a fundamental
part in securing countries’ resilience during the COVID crisis.
In this paper we first summarize the regulations and agreed
exposure limits for RF sources. We then consider the problem of
acceptance from a risk management perspective.
5G AND B5G ENGINEERING
5G and B5G Frequencies
Future mobile communications will deploy 5G and B5G.2 The
operating frequencies define the RF human hazards and the EMF
exposure limits. Following the 2020 edition of the ITU Radio
Regulations (RR), the following frequency bands are identified in
the ITU RR, to deploy International Mobile Communications
(IMT)3: 450–470, 470–698, 694/698–960, 1 427–1 518, 1 710–2
025, 2 110–2 200, 2 300–2 400, 2 500–2 690, 3 300–3 400,3 400–3
600, 3 600–3 700 and 4 800–4 990MHz; 24.25–27.5, 37–43.5, 45.
5–47 GHz, 47.2–48.2 and 66–71GHz4. The updated IMT RF band
are detailed in Table 3 of ITU-D/Europe (ITU/EMF 5G, 2021).
EMF Updated Exposure Levels From 5G
and B5G
The ICNIRP RF-EMF exposure Guidelines are backed by WHO
and constitute the current scientific consensus. “WHO encourages
the establishment of exposure limits and other control measures
that provide the same or similar level of health protection for all
people. It endorses the guidelines of ICNIRP and encourages
Member States to adopt these international guidelines”.5 WHO
advises that if regulatory authorities react to public pressure by
introducing precautionary limits in addition to the already
existing science-based limits, they should be aware that this
undermines the credibility of the science and exposure limits.6
WHO acknowledges both the ICNIRP Guidelines and the IEEE
standard on its website, but promotes the adoption of ICNIRP
Guidelines.
For the 5G and B5G frequencies (above 450 MHz) ICNIRP
(2020) power-density exposure levels around base-stations at
450—2000MHz equal fMHz/40 for occupational and fMHz/200
for the general-public. At 2–300 GHz the exposure levels equal
10W/m2 for occupational and 2W/m2 for general-public. For the
5G and B5G frequencies, the ICNIRP and IEEE power-density
limits (for whole-body exposure to continuous fields) are identical.
Joshi, (2020) collected data from commercial 5G networks in
Australia and the Republic of Korea and found that median
device transmit power levels were 1 per cent of the maximum and
comparable to 4G devices; this data is consistent with Ofcom’s
measurements of EMF exposures.
International Exposure Limits
The numeric standards for non-ionizing radiation exposure
limits are the formal steps taken by governments to limit both
the occurrence and consequences of risky exposures. The
following text is adopted in 2021 by ITU-D, ITU-T and by the
ITU-R Working Parties (WPs) 5A, 5B and 6A: “Administrations
are encouraged to follow the ICNIRP Guidelines or IEEE
Standard, or limits set by their own experts. The best practice
for administrations that choose to use international RF-EMF
exposure limits is to limit the exposure levels to the thresholds
specified in ICNIRP (2020) Guidelines.”
To date, more than 40 countries have put in place national
legislative frameworks covering static, low-frequency and high-
frequency fields for the general public and workers on either a
mandatory or voluntary basis. The details of these different legal
frameworks can be accessed from the WHO website.7 WHO
recommends that “an analysis of the balance between cost and
potential hazards is essential”, and calls for “strict adherence to
existing national or international safety standards”.8 WHO indicates
that the Framework “addresses how to develop science-based
quantitative EMF exposure limits” and “is intended for national
advisory and/or regulatory bodies that are either developing new
standards for EMF or reviewing the basis of their existing standards”.
9 The results of all of the studies and themeasurement results further
support the advice provided byWHO in relation to base stations and
wireless technologies: “Considering the very low exposure levels and
research results collected to date, there is no convincing scientific
evidence that the weak RF signals from base stations and wireless
networks cause adverse health effects”. 10
1Source: Rowley, J.T. and Knox, N., GSMA (personal communication), 31
July 2021.
2Beyond 5G (B5G) will include novel architectural and technology concepts to be
linked with 6G.
3IMT encompasses IMT-2000, IMT-Advanced and IMT-2020, as specified in
Resolution ITU-R 56-2. In this paper 5G and IMT-2020 are interchanged. In
this paper IMT is equivalent to 5G.
4Frequencies above 24.25 GHz were revised at ITU World Radio Conference
(WRC)-19
5WHO (2006). Framework for Developing Health-Based EMF Standards. https://
www.who.int/peh-emf/standards/EMF_standards_framework%5b1%5d.pdf?
ua1, pp. 7-8.
6WHO (2002). Establishing a dialogue on risks from electromagnetic fields.
Available at https://www.who.int/peh-emf/publications/risk_hand/en/.
7WHO. Global Health Observatory data repository. Public health and the
environment–EMF: Legislative status–Data by country. filter table | reset table
Last updated: 2018–06–11 https://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.main.
EMFLEGISLATIVESTATUS?langen.
8WHO. https://www.who.int/peh-emf/about/WhatisEMF/en/index5.html.
9WHO. Electromagnetic fields (EMF). Framework for developing health-based
EMF standards. https://www.who.int/peh-emf/standards/framework/en/.
10WHO (2006). Electromagnetic fields and public health. Base stations and wireless
technologies, Fact Sheet No. 304. https://www.who.int/teams/environment-
climate-change-and-health/radiation-and-health/electromagnetic-fields-and-
public-health.
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In February 2021, Australia became one of the first countries
to implement the ICNIRP (2020) Guidelines in a national
standard.11 Uganda also adopted these Guidelines.
The European Legal and Regulatory
Framework for Siting Base Stations
Europe in general12 follows the ICNIRP 2020 (and 2020) levels.
European regulatory rulings include the EC non-mandatory
Council Recommendation 1999/519/EC 13 which refers to
workers’ protection and Council Directive 2013/35/EU 14. In
addition there are European standards aimed at measurement of
EMF exposures of workers and the public151617. The general
public limits of ICNIRP 2020 18 (p. 511, Table 7) and the 1999/
519/EC (Annex III, Table 2) are identical, since ICNIRP (2020)
levels have been endorsed by the EC’s Scientific Steering
Committee. Directive 2013/35/EU Annex 3 Table A3 ‘Health
effects exposure limit values (ELVs) for exposure to EMF from 6
to 300 GHz’ states the power-density, 50W/m−2. So the European
Legal and regulatory framework for siting 5G and B5G base




Hesitancy over RF-EMF progress raises economic issues for
society. The delay in installing base stations causes harm to
users and delays service provision. Studies show that restrictive
limits risk doubling the investment required in the order of
billions19 and blocks the potential to use the spectrum and
address growing traffic requirements.20 In principle, the main
5G and B5G EMF risk is from handsets, transmitting into our
heads.
However, despite the fact that the level of radiation from 5G
roll-out to which the public is exposed is far below accepted
exposure limits, resistance to the technology should not come as a
surprise as it is well known that people often associate new
technologies, of whatever kind, with hazards (see Renn and
Benighaus, 2013). As early as the 1960s Starr (1969) noted
that the public were willing to accept “voluntary” risks roughly
1,000 times greater than “involuntary” risks Starr (1969), which
explains partially why most of the wrath is focused on base
stations as opposed to handsets. This bias is reinforced by Starr’s
other finding that the social acceptance of risk is directly
influenced by public awareness of the benefits of a technology.
The benefits of handsets are much more apparent than those of
base stations.
Starr’s research prompted further work on public attitudes to
risk by economists, psychologists and sociologists e.g., Tversky
and Kahneman (1974), Slovic (2000) and Rayner (1992). A
conclusion which emerges is that the kind of technical and
quantitative approaches described earlier in this paper provide
inadequate reflections of how risk is perceived by individuals. The
actual complexity of the situation has been described by Renn and
Benighaus (2013).
Within their scheme there are four levels of context, each of
which is split into collective and individual manifestations of risk
perceptions. At the basic level heuristics or common-sense
reasoning strategies are used to form opinions about hazards.
As you move up through the scheme cognitive and affective
factors (what people believe to be true about a risk), the social and
political institutions involved and their perceived trustworthiness
(shaped inter alia by the media including social networks), and at
the top level, cultural factors, come into play.
With regard to the latter, a particular explanatory theory has
been developed by Douglas and Wildavsky (1983) and others,
referred to as Cultural Theory. In brief, the theory posits four
plausible responses to a hazard depending on which of the
following groups one is tied to: hierarchists, egalitarians,
individualists or fatalists. The theory argues that each of these
worldviews is valid on its own terms, and that each exists because
the others exist.
To some extent in line with Cultural Theory’s projections,
research into public and expert attitudes to EMFs and
especially base stations in Germany (Ruddat et al., 2010)
identified a minority group of highly concerned individuals
which was distinct from a group showing little interest in the
health implications of the technology. A third group exhibited
concern which was fueled in part by the expectation that
scientists should be able to come up with definitive answers
about the risks of EMF instead of, merely, guidance, a view
predicated on a misunderstanding of the scientific process
Mills (2021).
11Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA).
ARPANSA releases new Australian radio wave safety standard, 25 February
2021. https://www.arpansa.gov.au/news/arpansa-releases-new-australian-radio-
wave-safety-standard
12Despite an EU Recommendation, some EU countries adopt more restrictive
thresholds; see WHO ‘EMF world wide standards.
13Council Recommendation of 12 July 1999 on the limitation of exposure of the
general public to electromagnetic fields (0 Hz–300 GHz)
14‘Minimum health and safety requirements regarding the exposure of workers to
the risks arising from physical agents (electromagnetic fields)’
15‘Product standard to demonstrate the compliance of base station equipment with
radiofrequency electromagnetic field exposure limits (110 MHz - 100 GHz), when
placed on the market’
16‘Measurement and calculation procedures for human exposure to electric,
magnetic and electromagnetic fields (0 Hz - 300 GHz)
17‘Procedure for the assessment of the exposure of workers to electromagnetic
fields’
18For ICNIRP 2020, see Table 9.2: (ICNIRP Table 5) Reference levels for exposure,
averaged over 30 minutes and the whole body, to electromagnetic fields from
100 kHz to 300 GHz (unperturbed rms values).
19An example of economic cost for society in Italy, which has 100 times stricter
power-density than EMF ICNIRP/IEEE limits, namely 10 W/m2 at frequencies
2—300 GHz for 30 min whole-body exposure; see ICNIRP (2020) Table 5 and
IEEE (2019) Table 7. Study from 2019 presented at the Italian Parliament argues
that avoiding installations of 27,900 5G base-stations approximately requires in
total € 4 billion additional costs.
20ITU-T K Suppl. 14 (09/2019) The impact of RF-EMF exposure limits stricter than
the ICNIRP or IEEE guidelines on 4G and 5G mobile network deployment.
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The experts believed the key to the problem was better
communication by mobile phone companies and especially
those involved in the siting of base stations. It was
considered that there was a breakdown in communication
with affected citizens at the siting stage, a view which
extended to almost all respondents, expert or lay, and
irrespective of whether they were sensitized or indifferent
to the issue of EMF.
Research by Hermans (2015) on siting concerns in the
Netherlands, however, opened up additional viewpoints.
Commencing with a review of the social science literature on
mast siting controversies, she found that the academic research
focus was largely framed around citizens’ understanding of the
health risks associated with the technology. This framing, by
itself, introduced a clear bias and inexorably led to the conclusion
that what was needed was public education via better risk
communication.
However, Hermans’ research showed that siting
controversies arose for a variety of reasons which could not
be labelled as “risk issues.” For example, concerns included lack
of involvement in the siting decision process, landscape
pollution, devaluation of property and ecological impacts,
and while health concerns were the most often mentioned
this appears to have been tied to a belief that such would
give legitimacy to the complaint although, in the Dutch case,
this misfired because planning authorities were precluded from
considering health risks.
Hermans goes on to argue that the choice by the Dutch
government to denote mast siting controversies as a scientific
matter shifted the problem from the political arena and, in so
doing, denied citizens’ rights to be engaged in the decision process
and reformulated the matter as one of baseless fears over health
risks, which were best dealt with via education and risk
communication.
Possible Solutions
As absolute proof about the non-existence of harm from NIR
cannot be anticipated regulators are placed in a difficult situation.
To solve this dilemma, some countries have applied the
precautionary principle (e.g., Burgess (2004), Rowley (2008)
and Wardman and Lo€fstedt, (2018)), either replacing or
augmenting the two-state risk management (threshold) model.
This constitutes a trade-off balance between the remaining
uncertainty and stricter requirements impacting on resources
and quality of service21.
As the choice between the two-state risk management model
or the precautionary approach has implications for society and
the economy, it is important to involve all stakeholders in
community awareness activities: government agencies, the
private Internet sector, non-governmental organization,
community groups and the general public. This need for
communication is central to all modern risk management
strategies. For example, the European Institute for Science,
Media and Democracy identified a set of Principles for the
management of risk (EISMD, 2019), which note that risk
communication should be an integral part of any risk
management activity (see Table 1). Likewise, the International
Risk Governance Council sees communication as central (IRGC,
2021). The consequences of not following this route have the
potential to create adverse socio-economic consequences for all
stakeholders, for example, encouragement of misinformation,
delays in upgrading networks and realizing associated benefits,
higher costs, environmental impacts and lost opportunities.
However, a further problem is that the debate may have been
at least partially mis-framed. In particular, evidence from the
Dutch study Hermans (2015) is that the debate over base
stations may have been influenced by a sector of the academic
community who depicted it as a health risk issue, whose
origin was a gap between laypersons’ understandings and
experts’ understandings, for which the remedy was further
communication of scientific knowledge. As Hermans says,
TABLE 1 | Principles of risk management EISMD (2019).
Guidance for decision makers on using risk concepts in making policy decisions
Principle 1 Risk decision making involves more than numbers
Principle 2 The concept of reasonableness must underpin all decisions
Principle 3 There is an inextricable ethical dimension to risk decision making
Principle 4 Risk elimination in public life is rarely sensible and potentially increases danger
Suggestions for improving the quality of risk analysis for public policy making
Principle 5 Risk communication should be integral to risk management activity
Principle 6 Policy makers should reflect on the appropriateness of attempts to alter people’s behaviour
Principle 7 Approaches to risk management must address the issue of trust in institutions
Principle 8 Participative / Deliberative approaches have potential both to promote sound risk management and legitimise decisions
Suggestions for helping the public to make better risk decisions for themselves
Principle 9 Risk literacy can be improved
Principle 10 The role of vested interests should be made more transparent
Principle 11 It should be recognised that all approaches to risk are provisional and are based upon currently available evidence and
prevailing social mores
21Mobile Phone Use for Contacting Emergency Services in Life-threatening
Circumstances, Wu et al., The Journal of Emergency Medicine, 52(3):291–298.
e293, March 2012.
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quoting Wynne (2008), “It becomes a real problem when
scientific knowledge is used as scientism or as public
authority knowledge.”
Thematter of framing is by nomeans confined toRF-EMF. In an
analysis and categorization of environmental concerns in general,
and their causes, Ball (2002) identified four main drivers of concern
as having substance-derived origins, value-derived origins, process-
derived origins or stakeholder-derived origins, and twelve sub-
categories. EMF base stations were listed under substance-derived
origins but in the sub-section denoted “the intention impinges
adversely on some other aspect of life or the common good
which is valued.” This is not to say that base station issues
aligned solely with that category as values, processes and
stakeholders were also implicated to some degree.
The foundational role of risk framing is illustrated by the
IRGC (2021) risk governance framework (Figure 1). Framing is
the first task listed in the framework, coming under the pre-
assessment stage.
Due to their large benefits, mobile communications will deploy
5G and B5G from 470MHz to 71 GHz. The approach now
sanctioned is to follow the best scientific advice, and WHO’s
stress on a need to balance the cost of control and the potential
risk is also a feature of current guidelines on risk management. For
example, EISMD’s Principle 2 is “The concept of reasonableness
must underpin all decisions” and Principle 4 is “Risk elimination in
public life is rarely sensible and potentially increases danger.’
Also included, however, Principle 1 states that “Risk decision
making involves more than numbers” and Principle 8 ‘Participative
/ Deliberative approaches have potential to promote sound risk
management and legitimize decisions.’ This opens the door for a
wider consideration of base station impacts including aspects
identified by Hermans (2015) such as choice of location, local
planning authority decision making, landscape impacts and the
justification for the technology. And, as noted by Rowley (2008), the
importance of separating health issues from planning policy
guidance in a way that is transparent to all stakeholders should
be acknowledged.
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